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FACING EVIL
Joseph E. Kennedy
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NATURAL BORN CELEBRITIES: SERIAL KILLERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE.
B y David Schmid. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
2005.Pp. viii, 327. $29.

It is no earthshaking news that the American public has become fasci
nated-some would say obsessed-with crime over the last few decades.
Moreover, this fascination has translated into a potent political force that has
remade the world of criminal justice. Up through the middle of the 1960s
crime was not something about which politicians had much to say. What
was there to say? "Crime is bad." "We do what we can about crime." "Crime
will always be with us at one level or another." Only a hermit could have
missed the transformation of crime over the last couple of decades from a
non-issue to a "hot button" that politicians from both parties have learned to
push with the frenetic energy of video game players competing for the high
est score. If the mantra of "tough on crime" has faded into the background
of political discourse a bit since the 1980s and 1990s, it is only because the
"tough on crime" philosophy has achieved the status of dogma-that which
almost no politician would take issue with. How and why the American pub
lic became so fascinated with crime and so supportive of punitive policies
remains something of a puzzle. 1
Perhaps punishment has increasingly become a communicative realm in
which society wrestles with intractable issues of social identity, sometimes
in a less-than-fully-conscious way. Seeing punishment as dramaturgy, as a
drama that serves a morally instructive role, is nothing new, of course, but
the idea here is that the dramaturgical dimension of punishment has grown
in importance over the last few decades. The public attends to stories of
crime and punishment as never before because they satisfy a felt need for
*

Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
North Carolina School of Law. B.A. 1982, Stanford; J.D. 1987, University of California at Los
Angeles. The author would like to thank Eric Muller and Hiroshi Motomura for thoughtful com
ments on this essay.
1. Even so, there has been no shortage of thoughtful attempts to fill in some of the missing
pieces. See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001); MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE
AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004); Jonathan Simon & Malcolm M. Feeley,
True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime, in PuNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CON
TROL 147 (Thomas G. Blomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995).
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morally instructive stories. Punishment has become, more than anything
else, an ongoing national morality play.
Within the last year, the University of Chicago Press published two
books that explore different dimensions of the public's current fascination
with crime and punishment. Natural Born Celebrities explores the growing
celebrity status of serial killers in American society since the nineteenth
century. Exploring the treatment of serial murder in film, TV, books, and
print media, the book ranges from the treatment of serial murder in nine
teenth century true-crime pamphlets to contemporary websites devoted to
Ted Bundy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and the like. The second book, High Profile
Crimes, explores the public attention given to a series of cases that enjoyed
sustained media treatment during the 1990s: the O.J. murder case, the Rod
ney King and Reginald Denny assault cases in Los Angeles, the Mike Tyson
and William Kennedy Smith rape trials, the racially motivated slayings of
African Americans in the Bensonhurst and Howard Beach cases, and the
Central Park jogger case. Each of these books helps us better understand the
dramaturgical dimension of contemporary punishment.
Exploring the roots of the public's interest in serial killers provides a
case study of a long recognized but not sufficiently understood dimension of
punishment: the way in which the public projects its fears about the health
2
of society onto certain archetypal criminal offenders. In Natural Born Ce
3
lebrities, David Schmid argues that the public's fascination with serial
killers is best understood as an attempt to work through fears that serial kill
ers are products of some aspect of social change. That attempt involves a
balance of sorts between indulgence of fears that serial killers are in some
way representative of society and reassurance that they are ultimately
uniquely monstrous.
Lynn Chancer's High Profile Crimes4 reveals how we "talk our politics"
through punishment. Specifically, the book explores the ways in which cele
brated cases become cultural and political battlegrounds involving various
social causes. At the heart of this exploration are issues of race and gender.
The enormous emotional energy that such causes mobilize gets channeled
into the legal system's either/or, guilty or innocent, winner-take-all frame
work. Such one-sided resolutions always prove unsatisfying and leave one
side-and sometimes both-looking for the next case to mobilize around.
Ultimately, Chancer suggests that in "cause-ifying" our cases and in "case
ifying" our causes, we have done damage to both the resolution of the par
ticular case and the progress of social causes.
After discussing each work in turn, I will briefly argue that all of the
phenomena described depend upon a common feature of our cultural land
scape: an abiding concern with moral relativism. We fear that we have lost
2. JOEL BEST, RANDOM VIOLENCE: How WE TALK ABOUT NEW CRIMES AND NEW VICTIMS
(1999); Joseph E. Ken nedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through Modem
Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000).
3.

Associate Professor of English at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
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the capacity to recognize, confront, and "face" evil. It is in response to this
fear that the ongoing national morality play of monstrous offenders meeting
5
harsh punishment has been staged. The public's fascination with serial kill
ers and with certain types of high profile cases illuminates important,
although different, dimensions of this response.
I. THE CELEBRITY OF THE SERIAL KILLER IN AMERICAN CULTURE

One might be tempted to dismiss interest in serial killers as simply a
morbid obsession with the grotesque. This interest ranges in its forms from
the concentrated obsession of some who bid for serial killer memorabilia on
websites purveying hair and other artifacts of notorious serial murderers, to
the more general interest in fictional and factual accounts of serial killers in
movie and book form. From Truman Capote's critically acclaimed account
of murder on the Great Plains, In Cold Blood (1965), to Ann Rule's best
selling account of Ted Bundy's crimes, The Stranger Beside Me (1980), to
Hannibal Lecter's popularity in the movie and book forms of The Silence of
6
the Lambs along with its various prequels and sequels, interest in serial
killers is undeniably wide-ranging and enduring. The strength of David
Schmid's exploration of the public attention given to serial killers is that it
moves past simple explanations of morbid curiosity into a more penetrating
inquiry about the nature of the public's interest.
There has long been a somewhat standard account of why we are fasci
nated with certain types of criminals generally. Our fascination with
criminals reflects contradictory impulses. We are simultaneously repelled by
the deviance of their crimes, but we also experience a vicarious thrill at the
freedom from social constraint that they experience.
Serial killers, to be sure, push the limits of such a theory. It is one thing
to feel a sneaking sense of admiration for a Tony Soprano figure who com
bines charm and other attractive human qualities with a readiness to kill the
people who get in his way, but in exactly what sense of the word can any
normal person be "thrilled" by Ted Bundy's ritual slaughter of numerous
women? Yet Ted Bundy has had numerous books, websites, movies, and
documentaries devoted to his exploits, and the next serial killer du jour will
probably enjoy the same.
Schmid transcends the standard story about vicarious escape from social
constraint by situating his account of the public's interest in serial killers in
a larger story about the evolution of celebrity in our society. He defines ce
lebrity as being primarily about visibility and distinguishes it from fame,
which he considers to be based in some way on merit. "[T]oday the famous
are the visible, rather than the talented" (Schmid, p. 9). In support of this
point, Schmid discusses a study that noted a striking change in the biogra
phies appearing in popular magazines between 1901 and 1941. The earlier
5.

See Kennedy, supra note 2.

6. THOMAS HARRIS, THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (1988); THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS
(MGM 1991).
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biographies were all about "idols of production," heroes from "the produc
7
tive life, from industry, business and natural sciences." Biographies during
this period included no sports figures, and the few entertainers included
were presented as "serious artists." Almost all of the biographies from 1941,
in contrast, were of "idols of consumption," people related to spheres of
leisure activity such as entertainment or sports (Schmid, p. 20). Schmid ar
gues that this change in the objects of public attention opened up a space for
the criminal celebrity. "Once fame is characterized primarily by visibility
rather than achievement, however, it no longer makes sense to distinguish
between good and bad forms of fame" (Schmid, p. 9).
Schmid is not saying that notions of merit or morality became entirely
irrelevant to celebrity. Rather, Schmid argues that there was an acute need
for both positive and negative role models for the millions of people who
migrated from rural areas to the cities during this time. The public used ce
lebrities to work through complicated and contradictory moral impulses
during this period of transition. Celebrities, such as movie actors, channeled
both negative and positive emotions. The same could certainly be said of
certain types of "heroic criminals," who alternately could be seen as either
deviant or expressing widely shared rebellious feelings against authority.
It is an interesting point. Around the tum of the century, as millions of
Americans embraced new ways of life, normative standards were undoubt
edly in flux. Was a robber baron who amassed wealth through monopoly
power a criminal or a super successful participant in the new economy? Was
a hard-drinking silent-film star who pushed the boundaries of acceptable
sexual behavior a deviant or someone who had freed himself from the op
pressive mores of rural, churchgoing America? Closer to the point, was a
stylish gangster who provided alcohol to the masses during Prohibition
really a criminal or simply a different type of entrepreneur?
The moral ambivalence of celebrity status may have served a necessary
function. As entire communities of newly arrived urban migrants were try
ing to figure out their own identities in a new social environment, it was
convenient to be able to alternately admire and despise those whose success
had made them visible enough to be common objects of discussion. What do
you think of that Charlie Chaplin or that Al Capone? Your answer could
change from day-to-day as you negotiated your own identity, as you figured
out what set of social norms you were willing to abide by.
Villains and rogues have always been the subjects of ballads, legends,
and other forms of public attention, but with the birth of the "celebrity," a
larger space in the public's attention may have opened up for notorious
criminals. It simply became more acceptable to be fascinated with people
who were not exactly society's most "productive" members.
Schmid acknowledges that "serial killers are not celebrated in the same
way as heroic criminals such as Jesse James and Bonnie and Clyde" because
we cannot empathize with them or their motives (Schmid, p. 19). So how
7.
Schmid, p. 20 (quoting LEO LowENTHAL, The Triumph of Mass Idols, in LITERATURE,
POPULAR CULTURE, AND SOCIETY 109, 112-13 (1961)).
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could we identify with someone who chops up numerous victims and buries
them in his or her basement? Schmid answers this very question directly
through his discussion of H.H. Holmes, the serial killer of the Chicago
8
World's Fair.
Arrested in 1894, Holmes was perhaps the first widely reported serial
killer in the United States. His case attracted intense interest by the media
and the public. In Schmid's view, Holmes raised profound questions of iden
tity for many Americans-his horrible crimes notwithstanding-and these
questions formed a big part of the public's interest. "Holmes's fame forced
Americans to debate whether a murderer was an archetypal or aberrational
American in a way they had not done before" (Schmid, p. 49).
Public fascination with the case began with discoveries made after a
search of Holmes's "Murder Castle."
·

Designed to be a combination home, business venture, and lodging house,
the building, when police began investigating it in July 1895, was found to
be a concentrated example of every gothic cliche imaginable, with con
cealed closets, secret staircases, sealed rooms, corridors that led nowhere,
and a basement filled with dissecting equipment, acid baths, and what ap
peared to be torture devices. Despite intensive investigation ... it proved
impossible to determine how many people had met their deaths in it or
precisely how they had died. (Schmid, pp. 53-54)

While most thought Holmes clearly mad, others argued that his crimes
were products of greed. Almost all of Holmes's victims were either people
on whom he had taken out insurance policies or people who had threatened
to tell the police about various moneymaking swindles in which Holmes
was involved (Schmid, p. 55). Furthermore, on at least two occasions he
even sold the skeletons of his victims to medical schools (Schmid, p. 55).
While Holmes was clearly deviant and aberrational, the economic di
mension of his crime tapped into an ongoing identity crisis about the nature
of economic activity in the new urban economy, in Schmid's view. Schmid
aptly points out that the Holmes case gave a new and uncomfortable mean
ing to the phrase "making a killing" (Schmid, p. 54). If one views Holmes as
a "wholly amoral businessman rather than a death-obsessed psychopath,"9
then he becomes "the nightmarish, perhaps inevitable, literalization of an
economic culture that increasingly viewed people as one more kind of raw
material," with the differences between him and the captains of industry
"one of degree rather than kind" (Schmid, p. 55). This identity crisis was
rooted in the fuzziness of the distinction between the positive archetype of
the self-made man and the negative archetype of the confidence man.
Over time, anxieties about how young men could do business in the "world
of strangers" that constituted the modern American city without resorting

8. Holmes was recently brought to public attention in Erik Larson's bestselling book. ERIK
LARSON, THE DEVIL IN THE WHITE CITY (2004).
9. Schmid, p. 56 (quoting William T. Brannon, The Anatomical Practice of Dr. H. H.
Holmes, in THE QUALITY OF MURDER: THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF TRUE CRIME COMPILED BY
MEMBERS OF THE MYSTERY WRITERS OF AMERICA 66, 71-72 (Anthony Boucher ed., 1962)).
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to hypocrisy dovetailed with concerns about how "self-making" was being
defined in increasingly financial and morally relativistic terms. What
united both kinds of anxiety was the usually unspoken perception that, like
it or not, hypocrisy worked in modern America. In other words, unscrupu
lous business practices tended to be the most profitable, and, inevitably,
profitability took precedence over scruples. (Schmid, p. 64)

It was not that the American public approved of outright deceit in busi
ness dealings. It was that "late-nineteenth-century Americans recognized
that he [Holmes] was motivated by desires they all shared to some extent"
and that there was "growing acceptance of the idea that the young American
on the make had to become a kind of confidence man himself in order to
10
succeed."
The more comforting view of Holmes was that he was not simply
greedy but simply mad. "Thinking of Holmes as a perverted monster places
him safely outside the bounds of normality, reinforcing both our own sense
of ordinariness and the ordinariness of the community, making that commu
nity a much safer and more desirable place to live" (Schmid, p. 55). While
monsters may provoke potentially destabilizing fear, "ultimately that fear
acts as a force for social cohesion" (Schmid, p. 55).
These alternate visions of Holmes as greedy or insane mirror two differ
ent views of serial killers more generally. Under one view, the serial killer is
simply an aberration whose existence tells us nothing about the society that
produced him. Under the alternative view, the serial killer is in some sense a
product of his society. His criminality was created or formed by some aspect
of how we all live together.
Schmid places these alternate visions of the serial killer within the larger
context of true-crime narratives generally. In reviewing the literature on
true-crime narratives from the Puritan era to the present, Schmid notes a
"preoccupation with the representativeness of the criminal; that is, whether
the criminal is more appropriately placed inside or outside of the commu
nity" (Schmid, p. 177). The Puritan doctrine of original sin and its emphasis
on the innate depravity of man "undercut any notion of the murderer's moral
11
peculiarity." The Puritans instead used execution sermons to emphasize the
sinfulness of all (Schmid, pp. 179-80). During the eighteenth century, how
ever, criminal narratives became more secular. As enlightenment notions of
man's innate rationality and goodness replaced the doctrine of original sin in
the public mind, true-crime narratives came to emphasize the monstrosity of
offenders (Schmid, p. 181). Although crimes occasionally were described as
"exemplifying current social and cultural trends," more typically they were
described in terms of gothic horror (Schmid, p. 183). This was particularly
evident in the nineteenth century "penny dreadful" press. "In each case the
relevant pamphlet stressed the manner in which the criminal was over10.
Schmid, pp. 64-65 (quoting KAREN HALTTUNEN, CONFIDENCE MEN AND PAINTED
WOMEN: A STUDY OF MIDDLE-CLASS CULTURE IN AMERICA, 1830-1870, at 205 (1982)).
11.
Schmid, p. 179 (quoting KAREN HALTTUNEN, MURDER MOST FOUL: THE KILLER AND
THE AMERICAN GOTHIC IMAGINATION 14 (1998)).
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whelmed by rage; the pamphlet cast him as berserk, violent, evil-in a
12
word, as a fiend." Schmid points out that the "fiend" of the nineteenth cen
tury "yellow" press is the direct antecedent of the serial killer of today's
true-crime narratives, a monstrous outsider "soothingly different from the
genre's implicitly normal readers" (Schmid, p. 196).
Society's tendencies to brand offenders as aberrational monsters are a
staple of punishment theory. Punishment as scapegoating-the process of
resolving one's anxieties about one's own society by constructing the of
fender as a monstrous other-is nothing new. Schmid, however, adds a
novel twist in his account. He argues that our abiding interest in serial
killers comes from a tension between their normality and monstrosity
(Schmid, pp. 200-05). There is an official narrative about the monstrosity
of serial killers and also a "hidden, disavowed narrative," and the public
attends with interest to the stories of serial killers in order to see how this
"unstable combination" of narratives is managed. In Schmid's view of the
evolution of the true-crime narrative generally, "monstrosity did not sim
ply replace the concept of representativeness" (Schmid, p. 182). Each
"coexisted in an ambivalent, dialectical relationship that became the defin
ing feature of true-crime narratives from the early nineteenth century
onward" (Schmid, p. 182).
More specifically, Schmid notes that the hunger to emphasize mon
strosity was nourished by fears of representativeness. "[I]t is precisely the
intuition that the criminal indeed represents his/her community that re
quires the attribution of monstrosity to stabilize the uncomfortable
blurring of normal and abnormal that fascination with the criminal in
spires" (Schmid, p. 182).
This dialectical relationship between representativeness and monstrosity
is evident in many of the contemporary serial killer narratives that Schmid
discusses. First, the outward "normality" of the killer is emphasized. Ted
Bundy, for example, was a "successful, ambitious, handsome, white,
straight, Republican, male" who was a respectful child and a college honor
student (Schmid, p. 212). He had once rescued a child from drowning and
on another occasion had chased down and captured a purse-snatcher
(Schmid, p. 212). Then, the seeds of the killer's innate monstrosity are
found in childhood events that might be strange but not necessarily evidence
of a homicidal disposition. An aunt recalls a three-year-old Bundy playing
with knives in the middle of the night; Jeffrey Dahmer's father recalls him
being fascinated with fish guts when they went fishing (Schmid, p. 206). In
each case, these childhood signs are there to offset the seeming normality of
the serial killer's adult life.
Ultimately, Schmid seems to believe that this tension between the outer
normalcy and inner monstrosity of the serial killer is what fascinates the
public. The public enjoys being frightened by the "just like us" quality of
the serial killer because it is understood that the otherness and monstrosity
12. Schmid, p. 181 (quoting DAVID RAY PAPKE, FRAMING THE CRIMINAL: CRIME, CUL
TURAL WORK, AND THE Loss OF CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE, 1830--1900, at 28 (1987)).
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of the serial killer will ultimately be affirmed. Understood this way, the tell
ing of the serial killer's tale takes on the significance of an obsessive ritual
that the public repeats over and over again, a ritual in which self-doubt is
entertained only so that it can be assuaged. Like the obsessive compulsive
who washes his hands over and over again, the public just never gets tired of
washing its collective hands of the serial killer.
Interestingly, the representativeness story is carefully managed so as not
to be too threatening. Schmid considers arguments that the straightness,
whiteness, and maleness of most serial killers are "representative" in a way
that goes beyond mere demography. The vast majority of serial killers are
middle class, straight, white men, and the vast majority of their victims are
women. Might the sociopathology of serial killers be simply a hyper
exaggerated manifestation of their gender, race, and sexual orientation?
Schmid explores this provocative question in a chapter aptly titled ''The Un
bearable Straightness of Violence" (Schmid, p. 209). He quotes Gloria
Steinem on this point to good effect:
[T]hese "senseless" killings begin to seem less mysterious when you con
sider that they were committed disproportionately by white, non-poor
males, the group most likely to become hooked on the drug of superiority.
It's a drug pushed by a male-dominant culture that presents dominance as a
natural right; a racist hierarchy that falsely elevates whiteness ... and a
3
1
homophobic one that empowers only one form of sexuality.

Schrnid's overall point here is that the gender, heterosexuality, and race
of straight white men "goes without saying" in most true-crime media and
literature. Being straight and white and male is simply not a topic of interest
because being straight and white and male is simply "normal." Schmid tries
to break through this sense of normalcy with a thought experiment he bor
rows from a study of the relationship between masculinity and violence
overall:
Imagine the reaction if close to 90 per cent of all violent crimes were
committed by women! If tabloid headlines carried stories, with some regu
larity, of man-hating women leaving behind them cross-country trails of
murdered men's bodies; of ex-wives, driven by fits of jealously, killing
their former husbands and their children; of groups of women killing each
other in rival gang fights. Imagine the scorn that would be heaped on
women for killing

each other off at such high rates!

havior would be perceived

as

How quickly such be

an aberration, a deviation from the norm of
14
male behavior, a "women's problem" to be dealt with urgently!

This point deserves attention. We live in a society in which violence by
men against women is far from uncommon and violence by men generally is
very common. To see the violence of serial killers against women as an ex-

13.
Schmid, p. 210 (quoting Gloria Steinem, Supremacy Crimes, Ms. MAGAZINE ONLINE,
Aug. l, 1999, http://www.afsc.org/pqork/0106/010618.htm).
14.
Schmid, p. 237 (quoting MYRIAM MIEDZIAN, BOYS WILL BE BOYS: BREAKING THE LINK
BETWEEN MASCULINITY AND VIOLENCE 11-12 (1991)).
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treme manifestation of those larger social currents would make serial killers
a "product" of our society in the same sense that some saw the avaricious
Holmes as a product of the wide-open capitalism of his time. Yet these
straightforward connections are not drawn, perhaps because they are not so
easily dismissed. If one equates being white and male and straight not with
being law-abiding but with feeling privileged to dominate others, then the
idea follows quickly that the pathological violence of serial killers against
women is influenced at some level by the privilege that straight white males
enjoy. So perhaps the story of white male privilege cannot be told in our
ongoing morality tale because it does not lead to an unambiguous rejection
of the representativeness of the serial killer. It is a spot that we cannot easily
wash out.
For the same reason, the public is not fascinated by the mundane vio
lence against women that occurs every day somewhere in this society. "No
15
one ever became famous by beating his wife to death in an alley." While
domestic violence has achieved greater prominence in the public mind, it
does not fascinate the public in the absence of truly lurid details. The crime
needs to be monstrous, not mundane, so that it can be easily disavowed. The
fact that domestic violence on its own terms is seen as mundane or ordinary
is, of course, part of the problem that is being finessed.
There is, however, yet another story one could entertain about serial kill
ers that Schmid does not touch upon. This story emphasizes not privilege or
power but the lack thereof. Perhaps serial killing comes not from a powerful
person but a powerless one, a person who lacks basic capacities that most
people enjoy: the capacity to empathize with others, to enjoy emotional and
sexual connection with others. The dissatisfaction one might experience at
the inability to experience such connections might be aggravated or given
shape by a sense of entitlement that white male privilege creates, but it
would not be an extension of that sense of privilege in the straightforward
sort of way that Schmid and Steinem seem to envision.
Such a lack of power, whether it is the product of nature or nurture,
plays little or no part in popular narratives about serial killers for a reason.
As I will argue in the concluding section of this review, such an alternate
story about serial killers would not lend itself to the morally instructive pur
poses which these stories serve in contemporary society. We need
powerful-not pathetic-monsters to keep the national morality play of
punishment going.
II. SOCIAL COMMUNICATION THROUGH HIGH PROFILE CASE S

High Profile Crimes explores the political and cultural dynamics swirling
around cases such as the O.J. Simpson murder case, the Rodney King and
Reginald Denny assault cases in Los Angeles, the Mike Tyson and William
Kennedy Smith rape trials, the racially motivated slayings of African
15. Schmid, p. 23 (quoting ELLIOTT LEYTON, HUNTING HUMANS: THE RISE OF THE MOD
ERN MULTIPLE MURDERER 21 (1989)).
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Americans in the Bensonhurst and Howard Beach cases in New York, and
the Central Park jogger case. Chancer calls these cases "provoking assaults."
A provoking assault, as she defines it, has four characteristics:
First, they are highly profiled incidents of violent crime that become sym
bolic of perceived social problems in a given time and place, engaging a
broad range of participants. Second, as they become symbolic, these inci
dents frequently merge legal cases and social causes.... Third, as cases
and causes become enmeshed, provoking assaults generate controversies
about whether responsibility for a given crime rests with individuals or so
cial forces, and whether apparent perpetrators were actually victimized, or
apparent victims were culpable to some extent. Fourth, because only a sin
gle incident is decided by an "either/or" verdict (and then only for one side
or the other), dissatisfactions tend to remain even after verdicts are handed
down. (Chancer, p.7)

Essentially, a provoking assault is a high profile case that becomes a cause,
and its cause-like nature affects how the case is received by the public.
The most noteworthy aspect of provoking assaults in Chancer's account
is the reduction of complex social issues into a two-sided, either/or, winner
take-all framework. Provoking assaults "are processed by participants
through a two-sided mode of argumentation . . . that structures and limits
debate around a framework of 'sides'" (Chancer, p. 7). This process, which
Chancer terms "partialization," flows from the structure of the legal system
and from traditional media practices (Chancer, p. 247). Legal cases by their
nature result in verdicts that declare one side the winner and one side the
loser (Chancer, pp. 9-12). Journalism, too, tends in favor of "the appeal of
stories that involve seemingly stark antagonisms between issues and
spokespersons" (Chancer, p. 38). Chancer does concede ''that while the legal
system has good reason to maintain a dualistic framework to adjudicate mat
ters of guilt or innocence, the press has less analogous justification for doing
so" (Chancer, p. 262).
In essence, Chancer argues, in provoking assaults, cases become causes
and causes become cases. The interesting work of the book is the explora
tion of the reasons for and the results of this phenomenon.
Chancer argues that these high profile cases became more common in
the 1990s for specific social and historical reasons. In particular, she identi
fies three factors: "(1) rising public concerns about violent crime as a social
problem, (2) controversies surrounding issues of 'identity politics' concern
ing gender, sexuality, and race, and (3) a larger-than-ever explosion of inner
and intramedia competition" (Chancer, p. 254). So in the midst of continu
ing controversy about race, gender, and other social issues, the public grows
more concerned about crime just as the media turns more tabloid-a "per
fect storm" that created a spate of "crimes of the century" in Chancer's
telling.
A different book might have parsed the links between these three seem
ingly distinct developments. To what degree was public sensitivity to the
historic increase in violent crime during the 1970s a function of the larger
insecurities about social stability that were themselves products of changes
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in race and gender relations? Was white middle-class America more afraid
of crime because blacks were no longer confined to their place and because
social values in general seemed more up for grabs in an environment in
which family life was being redefined by the changing status of women?
Even more interesting perhaps, was the "tabloidization" of the mainstream
press during this time just a historical coincidence driven by institutional
changes in the corporate structure of Big Media? Or were those institutional
changes a response to a new hunger amongst the public for a different type
of storytelling, one that disdained a detached expert perspective and de
manded instead a passionate involvement in the dramatic events of life,
death, and sex?
Chancer's focus ultimately is less on the whys of provoking assaults
than on the hows. She explores in detail how they work. At the center of
what she finds is an appreciation for the way in which stories about individ
ual crimes invest rational arguments about social justice with emotional
content. Provoking assaults become a "medium of politicized American de
bate" by "concretizing social issues through single cases that permit
emotions to be vented and reasoned arguments to be made" (Chancer, p.
17). "[T]he cases provide an everyday conversational vehicle for debating
social issues in a way that marries emotion and logic in lively argumenta
tion" (Chancer, pp. 212-13). And they have the added authority of being
"real."
The first case Chancer discusses in detail nicely illustrates a number of
these points. The Central Park jogger case of 1989 involved a brutal rape
and assault of a white female who was jogging in Central Park in New York
City. She was beaten so badly that she almost died and had no memory of
the assault. That night, a group of African American teenagers who had re
portedly been harassing park-goers were taken into custody on suspicion of
having attacked her as a group. During the course of the evening some of
them confessed, although they subsequently recanted their confessions.
Almost all of the media outlets withheld the victim's name, so the case
became known as "the Central Park jogger" case. From the beginning the
case enjoyed an enormous amount of media coverage and public attention.
The basic elements of the case seemed almost tailor-made to tap into potent
social concerns.
[T]he story of the Central Park jogger-a young, successful white woman
brutally raped and attacked by a group of minority male teens-provided a
narrative framework for debating a wide range of social problems from in
ner-city crime to racial discrimination, violence against women, and the
role of the media itself. (Chancer, p. 60)
At the center of these controversies were questions about the guilt or in
nocence of the accused. "[E]arly media coverage had constructed stark
oppositions between the 'evil' of the accused and the 'goodness' of the vic
tim" (Chancer, p. 51). Some media accounts depicting the youth as a "wolf
pack" were decried by representatives of the African American community
as incendiary, as prejudging the guilt of the accused, and as racially based.
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The case also became a focal point for white concerns that liberal atti
tudes concerning crime and race had made New York City a dangerous place
to live. These latter sentiments were given their most extreme public expres
sion in a full-page advertisement taken out by Donald Trump. What is most
notable about the ad is the way that it exults in a one-sided emotionalism:
What has happened to our City over the past ten years? . .. What has hap
pened to the respect for authority, the fear of retribution by the courts,
society and the police for those who break the law, who wantonly trespass
on the rights of others? What has happened is the complete breakdown of
life as we knew it .. .. [R]oving bands of wild criminals roam our
neighborhoods.. . . Mayor Koch has stated that hate and rancor should be
removed from our hearts. I do not think so. I want to hate these muggers
and murderers. They should be forced to suffer and, when they kill, they
should be executed for their crimes... . Yes, Mayor Koch, I want to hate
these murderers and I always will. I am not looking to psychoanalyze or
understand them, I am looking to punish them. . . . BRI NG BACK THE
16
DEATH PENALTY AND BRING BACK OUR POLI CE!
This exultant emotionalism obviously spoke to issues well beyond this
case. It did not matter, for example, that no one was murdered in the Central
Park jogger case or that the death penalty was not at issue. "Once the 'Cen
tral Park' case was endowed with symbolic significance, different parties
looked to the mass media to publicize their larger concerns and to express
passionate feelings-from resentment to rage-evoked by the crime and its
,,17
representation.
With respect to race, the shoe was on the other foot in the next case that
Chancer describes, the murder of Yusef Hawkins in the Bensonhurst
neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York, later that same year. Hawkins, an
African American sixteen-year-old went to the predominantly white
neighborhood with three African American friends to look at a used car that
was for sale. They were attacked without provocation by a group of white
teenagers with baseball bats. Hawkins was shot in the chest by one of the
whites and killed (Chancer, p. 61). While further facts remain murky, media
reports at the time suggested that the white teenagers were lying in wait
"'for black or Hispanic youths whom they thought were dating a white
"18
neighborhood girl.'
For African Americans, the case was about basic freedoms. A hard work
ing African American youth who did nothing more than walk into a white
neighborhood had been murdered. For Bensonhurst residents, however, the
case was about community. Some claimed that the white woman in question
had threatened her former boyfriend that " 'she was going to bring as many
•

1 6.

Chancer, pp. 48-49 (quoting Donald Trump, Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, May I, 1989, at

A3).
1 7 . Chancer, pp. 58-59. Chancer notes that years later another man confessed to the rape and
assault. Chancer, p. 29.
1 8. Chancer, p. 65 (quoting Ralph Blumenthal, Black Youth Is Killed by Whites; Brooklyn
Racial Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1989, at A l ).
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as 30 youths to beat him and his friends.' "19 "The problem was 'turf . . .
[and] territory;' by implication, violence would have erupted even if Irish or
German teenagers had entered the neighborhood for the purposes of chal
20
lenging local Bensonhurst youths."
The dominant response from Bensonhurst residents, however, seems to
have been not to defend the accused but to complain that the entire
neighborhood was being branded as racist based on a single incident. Resi
dents complained, in particular, that the case was being referred to simply as
"Bensonhurst," which they felt to be a way of slurring their neighborhood.
"[W]idespread in the community was the feeling that high-profile coverage
of the 'Bensonhurst' case had demeaned people in the neighborhood, and
made them feel 'put down' " (Chancer, p. 95). This "tapped the defensive
ness on the parts of many residents about their lack of socioeconomic status
and their Italian American ethnicity" (Chancer, p. 95). Complaining of re
verse racism, Bensonhurst residents maintained that the media were treating
the incident more harshly because the accused were white and so was the
neighborhood in which they lived.
Chancer argues that race did influence how Bensonhurst and other pro
voking assaults are covered by the media but in a far more complicated way
than simple charges of racism or reverse racism would suggest. Chancer
describes an almost dialectical relationship between succeeding high profile
cases. "[O]nce prior cases have been given extraordinary media attention,
they in tum influence which future stories are selected for attention" (Chan
cer, p. 185). These "journalistic precedents" influence journalistic choices in
ways that journalists themselves do not appreciate. Most of the journalists
Chancer interviewed thought for the most part that interest in each case was
the result of "unique features about those cases" (Chancer, p. 185). Chancer
makes a convincing case, however, that "rather than selecting a case for its
uniqueness, journalists often make cultural associations between past and
present events, assessing new developments against the backdrop of cases
already established" (Chancer, p. 37).
Chancer terms this process 'journalistic relativism.'' For example, Chan
cer suggests that journalists may have selected the Bensonhurst case (in
which the victim was black and the accused white) for high profile treat
ment because they had been criticized for the amount of attention they
lavished on the Central Park jogger case-in which the races and roles were
reversed (Chancer, p. 76). Those criticisms included complaints about the
relatively scanty coverage given to the rape of an African American woman
in Central Park a short time before the jogger attack. "Subtly, reporters and
editors may have reacted to community criticisms of them in 'Central Park'
by shifting the sociological contents, if not the forms, of the stories they
next reported" (Chancer, p. 75). The Simpson case "also continued a pattern
of debating racism, and 'reverse' racism though high-profile crime cases of
the 1990s" (Chancer, p. 183).
19.

Chancer, p. 67 (quoting Blumenthal, supra note 18).

20.

Chancer, p. 68 (quoting Blumenthal, supra note 18).
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Ultimately, Chancer concludes that provoking assaults such as the O.J.
Simpson case, the Central Park jogger case, and the Bensonhurst case per
form a communicative function in our society. "Because provoking assaults
are at once legal cases and social causes, they offer a way of "talking poli
tics" (Chancer, p. 213). Cases are selected for attention-by both the media
and the public-because they are apt vehicles for the continuation of an on
going conversation of larger social issues. "These highly profiled crime
cases may have risen to prominence, receiving extraordinary coverage, pre
cisely because they engaged passions of a distinctly political kind; the cases
provided an opportunity for people more and less involved to debate contro
versial social issues of the day and place" (Chancer, p.252).
Chancer vividly illustrates this communicative dimension in describing a
confrontation between whites and blacks during a demonstration in Benson
hurst.Quoting from a New York Times account, she describes a confrontation
in which blacks and whites used past cases as a sort of shorthand for challeng
ing and accusing one another:
The marchers, shouting "Whose streets, Our streets" ....
The whites chanted, "Central Park, Central Park" .... The black
demonstrators in Bensonhurst chanted back, "Howard Beach, Howard
Beach."
Later, the blacks' chants changed to "Yusef, Yusef." Yusef Hawkins is
the 1 6-year-old black youth whose death sparked the protest. The whites
21
yelled back, "We want Tawana, we want Tawana."

Should we "talk our politics" through high profile cases? Chancer sees
both sides of this question. "Do high-profile crime cases of the provoking
assault variety bode a new and important form of politics ... ? Or ... do
these cases distract us from underlying problems in the media and the legal
system that are structural in character?" (Chancer, p. 251). Ultimately,
Chancer concludes that these "provoking assaults are intrinsically ambiva
lent phenomena that have socially advantageous and disadvantageous
aspects at the same time" (Chancer, p.251).
For the most part, however, Chancer seems to dwell on the dysfunctional
aspects of merging cases with causes. She points out that the polarizing ef
fects of these cases pressure people to "take sides" (Chancer, p. 13) and that
the complexity and sophistication of our political discourse will potentially
be impoverished as a result. (Chancer, p. 215). Chancer illustrates this point
with a revealing quote from a respondent discussing the Simpson case. "Do
you know what? Sometimes I think that whether or not O.J. is guilty, I can't

21. Chancer, p. 82 (quoting Nick Ravo, 250 Whites Jeer Markers in Brooklyn Youth's Death,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1989, at B3). "Howard Beach" refers to an earlier racially motivated killing of
a Jamaican immigrant by a white crowd in a different Brooklyn neighborhood. See Chancer, pp. 3536. "Tawana" refers to Tawana Brawley, an African American woman who made an elaborate rape
accusation against a number of white government officials that was later demonstrated to be a hoax.
See Chancer, pp. 36, 244, 286 n.26.
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afford for him to be guilty.Where would that leave me given everything else
that's happened?" (Chancer, pp.242-43).
For this (presumably) African American respondent, admitting the guilt
of O.J. Simpson would seem to be "letting down his side" in a way that
seems unacceptable given the overall state of race justice. Chancer also
points out that crossing sides in these controversies can also implicate your
relations with other members of your social group. "[M]any people ex
pressed figurative as well as literal fears of what would happen if they failed
to partialize, that is failed to take the side they were 'supposed' to" (Chan
cer, p. 247). "[T]he dualistic structure framing such cases diminishes the
likelihood that people will be able to acknowledge what is valid in each
side; more likely, they will remain partial to the side they already favor"
(Chancer, p. 215).
Chancer also concludes that the attention given high profile cases diverts
attention from the larger issues in a way that ultimately lets society "off the
hook" (Chancer, p. 257). "[S]ystemic analyses do not usually result from
discussion of these cases and the questions of economic, racial, and gen
dered discrimination, and/or the character of the media, they raise"
(Chancer, p. 258). Ultimately, these cases raise complex issues that cannot
be resolved in a simple two-sided way. They bite off more than they can
chew.
III.THE

CATCH-22 OF CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT

The two works discussed each explore a different facet of the public's
current fascination with crime. That fascination is, however, part of a larger
story about the role that the punishment of crime plays in the contemporary
public mind. Stories of crime and punishment have always served as moral
ity plays for society at large. The dramaturgical dimension of punishment
has grown more powerful during the last few decades. Important changes in
the substantive and procedural criminal law have been crafted and enacted
in the wake of particularly gripping stories of particular crimes. The Willie
Horton case may have helped decide the 1988 presidential election. The
death of Polly Klaas in California ushered in a wave of three-strikes legisla
tion. The death of Megan Kanka in New Jersey led to a spate of laws
requiring community notification of the release of sex offenders, a type of
law that is colloquially referred to as "Megan's Law." More generally, the
politics of crime has been dominated by emotional populist appeals to a
"common sense" punitiveness that dismisses the larger social context of
crime in favor of a relentless focus on the most evocative aspects of the suf
fering of victims. Such a focus permits politicians supporting punitive
measures to simply frame the issue as one of good versus evil.
Fully describing how this populist punitivism came to be is the work of
a book, not a review essay. The two works reviewed illuminate an important
piece of this larger story, however.Each demonstrates the role that anxieties
about moral relativism play in the way the public thinks about crime and
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punishment, although that role differs markedly in the two phenomena
discussed.
The reason that the public has an endless appetite for the serial killer tale
that Schmid describes-a tale in which the public is tantalized by the idea
that serial killers are products of some social ill but ultimately reassured that
they are simply monstrous aberrations-is that a "seemingly normal" mon
ster brings the public face-to-face with the difficulties of defining evil in an
age in which simple accounts of human behavior are no longer convincing.
What was it about Ted Bundy that would allow him to save a drowning
child and pursue a purse-snatcher but not feel repelled by the enormous fear
and pain he was inflicting on his victims? A deterministic biological expla
nation would suggest that he might simply be missing some neurological
pathway in his brain that the rest of us take for granted.A purely environ
mental explanation might posit that the baseline capacity of empathy that
nurture and culture imbue in the vast majority of people was never incul
cated in him. A mixed approach might suggest that he lacked something
neurologically but that this deficit was aggravated by the right combination
of environmental circumstances. An even more nuanced view might admit
some combination of environmental and neurological factors but also main
tain that some measure of choice remains. Under this latter view, there may
be a number of people in society with brain chemistry like Bundy's and with
similar environmental triggers or deficits, but these people simply choose to
empathize with others to a degree that prevents them from inflicting such
random violence-a choice that Bundy could have made but did not.
The modem sensibility admits the possibility of each of these views of
evil. The essential unknowability of how nature, nurture, and choice com
bine to produce the acts of any particular individual poses a catch-22 for
society.We want people to be good, but we recognize that there are factors
that make it easier for some and harder for others to do so. The catch-22 is
that one of the environmental factors affecting choice is the determinacy and
authority of the law.If our practices of punishment admit that sometimes the
evil of an individual's crime is relative, then it seems logical to expect that
more people may commit crimes out of a sense that committing a crime is
not fully their fault. Conversely, the more unambiguously we punish, the
more likely that people in general will choose the moral path when they are
capable of doing so.
In Joseph Heller's novel, Catch-22, only people who were crazy did not
have to go into combat, but anyone who did not want to go into combat was
22
by definition not crazy. In a similar fashion, the more people recognize that
environment influences culpability, the more we must pretend that it does
not.
It is this paradox that lies at the heart of the compulsive attention that the
public accords serial killers. The serial killer is the perfect means of working
through anxieties about the catch-22 of contemporary punishment because
we already know the end of the story. There is no doubt in society's mind
22.

See JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1955).
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that people who kill people again and again simply for the experience of
killing are evil. The ultimate monstrosity of serial killers allows society to
safely entertain its fears that our social environment has in some way pro
duced them, a fear that draws its cathartic power from the killers' seeming
normality.
Ultimately, however, serial killers are only a freakish side show in the
circus of American punishment. The main event is race. Race permeates the
white fear of violent crime. African Americans in particular are sources of
such fear. It is surely not coincidental that race figures prominently in all but
one of the cases that Chancer considers in her study of high profile cases.
The dilemma of how to account for environmental conditions in punishment
without weakening the authority of the penal law is felt most acutely in
American society when the offender is African American, particularly an
African American male from the inner city. Conversely, violent crimes
against African Americans raise the specter of racial fear converted into
hatred.
The public's fascination with the high profile cases that Chancer calls
provoking assaults is rooted in a very different fear than the one that powers
the celebrity of serial killers. The punishment of a serial killer is a morality
play in which consensus is relatively easy to achieve. We know how the
story ends. The serial killer is a monster and deserves the harshest punish
ment. Provoking assaults represent the other end of the spectrum. There is
no consensus. The fight played out in the trial and in the media over guilt
and innocence is real, but the fight is not just about the individual case. It is
more about the causes that have mobilized around the case.
Whereas serial killers involve the fear that we are too caught up in moral
relativism to confront obvious evil, the interest in provoking assaults is born
of a fear that we are too prejudiced by race or gender to judge evil correctly.
The groups rallying around the different sides of these cases accused one
another of being racist or sexist. Sometimes the charge was "reverse racism"
or "reverse sexism" when the defendants were white or male. Sometimes the
charge was simple racism when they were black.
Similarly, the race or gender of the victim played into charges that the
crime was not being taken seriously enough.
Two different senses of facing evil are at play here. In the case of serial
killers, the fear driving the public's interest is that moral relativism disables
us from recognizing and condemning obvious evil. The fear is that we lack
the moral will to confront or face evil when we see it clearly-the requisite
moral clarity to call a monster a monster. In the racially and sexually
charged high profile cases of the 1980s and 1990s, the fear is that we are too
blinded by prejudice to even agree on who is evil-that we are condemned
by our legacy of race-based or gender-based thinking to put the wrong face
on evil.
By obsessing about serial killers and high profile cases in which race
and gender are implicated, society works through the difficulties of facing
evil in both senses of the phrase. These are not healthy obsessions. Both
distort our priorities and divert us from the larger issues that truly ail us.
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Perhaps understanding these obsessions more clearly, however, is a first step
to letting them go.

